

D-R-A-F-T

31 July 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : CIA Participation in the Defense
Intelligence Projections for
Planning (DIPP)

1. With the removal of the NIPP from the USIB arena to DIA and its consequent conversion from national to departmental intelligence a major question was created. What will be the standing of the new document outside of the Department of Defense? In an apparent effort to give the document a quasi-national standing, i.e., community blessing, DIA is expecting in depth "participation" by other members of the intelligence community both directly and through the USIB subcommittees, GMAIC, JAEIC, and SIC. We and State in particular are concerned as to the standing which the DIPP will have and the consequent influence which it would have on intelligence outside of DOD, such as in NSSMs, ACDA, and support to NATO. Corollary to this is the question of the extent of commitment of CIA to the positions taken in the DIPP and the degree to which CIA production elements will be constrained.

2. Key to the question of standing will be the nature of CIA participation. From OSR's point of view the question can be expressed as how can CIA participate without presenting the CIA position when it diverges from the basic document. Regardless of the details of format in the final document, DIA intends all such views to be alternative, or in effect, footnotes.

3. The types of participation which have been suggested and in some cases requested are:

- a) CIA participation in working groups developing force tables and texts.
- b) Limited substantive review for a specific purpose (e.g., review document to check for consistency with the NIEs).
- c) Participation through USIB subcommittees (GMAIC, JAEIC, and SIC).
- d) Contribution in depth including annexes where appropriate presenting a full, detailed CIA position.
- e) Provide costing data for projected forces.
- f) Provide consulting support to DIA to assist in their organization and administration of the DIPP.

4. If CIA participates substantively to any degree then CIA lends credibility to the document. This means then that differing CIA views must be included or we will be in the position of endorsing what we believe to be erroneous positions. Where there are differences between the principal view and a DIA alternative in an NIE the positions would be reversed in the DIPP and the DCI's position would be the alternative.

5. For each of the possible types of support except administrative consultation additional problems arise. For example, OSR would be spending resources developing cost data on force projections which we believe are invalid. Similarly the USIB subcommittees would be making contributions which when they differed from a DIA position would be relegated to a footnote status.

6. In my view the problems all stem from a simple fact of life. A comprehensive and complex product such as the DIPP cannot be both a departmental intelligence document and at the same time reflect the views of the community. I recommend that CIA

participation be confined to the type of assistance which is currently being provided by [REDACTED] of ONE, i.e., 25X1A9a advising on the administrative and organizational problems inherent in such an effort and that the final document should contain no reference to CIA.

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